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Liberty, Equality and Deference:
A Comment on Colin Feasby’s
“Freedom of Expression and the Law
of the Democratic Process”
Christopher D. Bredt and Laura Pottie*
I. INTRODUCTION
In his paper, “Freedom of Expression and the Democratic Process,” Colin Feasby accepts the Supreme Court’s adoption of the egalitarian model of electoral regulation in Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General).1 Feasby’s main arguments are two-fold. First, while the
Court should generally be deferential to Parliament’s choices regarding democratic processes, Feasby asserts that this deference should not
extend beyond the electoral realm. Thus, to the extent that the Canada
Elections Act provisions at issue in Harper extend to non-electoral
speech (i.e., to “pure” issue advocacy), there should be no deference.
Second, Feasby argues that courts should be highly suspicious of legislation that tends to support the status quo, since this can be seen as
self-interested behaviour.
We agree to a large extent with Feasby’s positions, with two main
provisos. First, while the egalitarian model may be appropriate in some
contexts, it is inadequate to address the range of participants and the
resources brought to bear in an electoral context, nor does it accurately
capture the range of regulations that Parliament has enacted. In fact,
regulation of the electoral regime occurs within a range of libertarian and
egalitarian principles. A more comprehensive approach to understanding
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Christopher D. Bredt is a partner and the National Chair of Borden Ladner Gervais
LLP’s Constitutional Law Practice Group. Laura Pottie is an associate in the Commercial Litigation
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1
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper”].
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electoral regulation that takes all of the participants and all of the resources into account is necessary.
Second, while we agree with Feasby’s position that deference
should not extend to non-electoral regulation of political advocacy, we
believe that a healthy dose of judicial scepticism is particularly warranted in respect of regulation of advocacy within the electoral context.
Experience has demonstrated a clear tendency for Parliament to enact
legislation that preserves the status quo by giving preferential access to
resources to incumbents and/or large established parties. This tendency
should be balanced by a requirement for convincing evidence when
justifying restrictions on participation in an election.

II. THE EGALITARIAN MODEL IS INADEQUATE
The egalitarian model is neither a comprehensive answer to the issues posed by electoral regulation, nor has the concept been applied
consistently by Parliament or by the courts. The electoral process involves a complex interplay between a number of different participants
with differing roles and access to a variety of resources. Electoral regulation and judicial review of participants and their access to these resources has seen both egalitarian and libertarian principles applied.
However, both Parliament and the courts seem to address the intersections between participants and resources in isolation, without a consistent or principled approach to regulation.
There are a number of participants in the electoral process, each
with differing and sometimes overlapping roles. These participants
include:
• political parties, including large established parties with national
reach, smaller issue-specific or regional parties and fringe parties;
• candidates, including candidates who are members of registered
parties and independents;
• third parties, which are usually interest groups that are issuefocused, and seek to influence the views of others; and
• voters, who may be members of a political party, activists, or independent.
Each participant brings a variety of resources to the process. These
resources include:
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•
•
•
•
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money, which is the most highly regulated resource;2
ideas, which are unregulated;
political capital, such as public profile and organizational ability,
which is largely unregulated; and
access to the media, which has a mix of regulated and unregulated
aspects.3

While money is a primary focus of electoral regulation, it is but one
of a number of factors that determine whether or not any particular
candidate is elected. Other resources can have an equal or even greater
influence, and attempts to “equalize” one of these resources while leaving others unregulated may only serve to exacerbate inequality. Equality
is an elusive if not impossible goal in this context.
For example, a candidate who is relatively unknown in a community
may have access to significant financial resources, but may find these
resources inadequate to challenge a long-time incumbent who is wellknown and respected within the electoral district. Similarly, no amount
of money will suffice to “sell” an unpopular platform to an electorate; if
a candidate’s positions are out of step with the needs or desires of his or
her constituency, access to financial resources may not result in the
election of that candidate. Candidates with equal financial resources will
often have varying levels of charisma, media coverage, community
status or public profile, and intellectual capital both in the form of individual ideas and support from campaign managers and staff.
While the Supreme Court in Harper expressly adopted the “egalitarian” approach, its application of this approach is not consistent. Consider for example the apparent conflict between the decisions in Sauvé v.
Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) and Carter v. Reference re Provincial
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.).4 In Sauvé, the Supreme Court focused on
the effect of denying federal inmates the right to vote. The Court held
that disenfranchisement of a discrete group of individuals threatened,
among other things, the principles of equal rights and equal membership
2

For example, see Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 [hereinafter “Elections Act”],
ss. 404, 404.1, 404.2, 404.3, 405, 405.2, 405.21, 405.3, 422, 423, 440, 441, 443.
3
For example, access to the print media and the Internet are unregulated, while access to
the broadcast media is highly regulated. See Elections Act ss. 319-362.
4
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519
[hereinafter “Sauvé”]; Carter v. Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991]
S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Boundaries”].
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embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”).5 This
right to equal membership, however, apparently does not include the
right to have one’s vote counted equally. In Saskatchewan Boundaries,
the Supreme Court was willing to accept deviations in voter parity of up
to 25 per cent as acceptable under section 3. The Court expressly disclaimed an equality-based approach in that case, stating:
Respect for individual dignity and social equality mandate that
citizen’s votes not be unduly debased or diluted. But the need to
recognize cultural and group identity and to enhance the participation
of individuals in the electoral process and society requires that other
6
concerns also be accommodated.

The most striking example of the inconsistency with which the egalitarian approach is applied and the inequality this creates is apparent
when the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper is considered against
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).7 There the Court applied section 3 of the Charter to Election Act provisions restricting access to
certain benefits to political parties flowing from registered party status.
In order to obtain registered party status (and thus the benefits), the
party was required to have nominated candidates in at least 50 electoral
districts. The benefits included the issuance of tax receipts for donations
received outside the election period, the right to transfer unspent election funds to the party, and the right to list party affiliation on the ballot.
Justice Iacobucci writing for the majority in Figueroa, emphasized
that the right to vote under section 3 included more than simply the right
to place a ballot in a box. Justice Iacobucci cited and concurred with
McLachlin J.’s (as she then was) analysis in Haig v. Canada:
The purpose of s. 3 of the Charter is, then, to grant every citizen of
this country the right to play a meaningful role in the selection of
elected representatives who, in turn, will be responsible for making

5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11. See Sauvé, supra, note 4, at 545-46, para. 35.
6
Saskatchewan Boundaries, supra, note 4, at 188, para. 62. See also the Alberta Court of
Appeal’s rejection of an egalitarian approach to the allocation of free and discounted broadcast time
during an election in Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] A.J. No. 212,
123 D.L.R. (4th) 366 (C.A.), which is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Figueroa, discussed infra.
7
[2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 [hereinafter “Figueroa”].
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decisions embodied in legislation for which they will be accountable
8
to their electorate. (Emphasis added)

According to the majority in Figueroa, therefore, the right to vote
includes the right to play a meaningful role in the electoral process. This
is a participatory right, and one that is of fundamental importance in a
free and democratic state. The right to participate in the electoral process is not necessarily related to the composition of Parliament subsequent to an election, nor is the value of such participation related to its
impact on the actual outcome of an election. As stated by Iacobucci J:
It follows that participation in the electoral process has an intrinsic
value independent of its impact upon the actual outcome of elections.
To be certain, the electoral process is the means by which elected
representatives are selected and governments formed, but it is also the
primary means by which the average citizen participates in the open
debate that animates the determination of social policy. The right to
run for office provides each citizen with the opportunity … to express
support for the ideas and opinions that a particular candidate endorses.
In each instance, the democratic rights entrenched in s. 3 ensure that
each citizen has an opportunity to express an opinion about the
formation of social policy and the functioning of public institutions
9
through participation in the electoral process. (Emphasis added)

On this understanding of section 3, the Court set a two-part test to
determine whether a restriction interferes with the capacity of individual
citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process:
(a) does the organization in question (in that case, members and supporters of political parties that nominate fewer than fifty candidates)
play a meaningful role in the electoral process, and
(b) do the restrictions interfere with their capacity to do so?10
In Harper, Bastarache J. ostensibly adopted and applied the
Figueroa analysis, but the result is inconsistent. Justice Bastarache

8
Haig v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, at para. 63, [1993] 2 S.C.R.
995, at 183, cited in Figueroa, supra, note 7, at 933, para. 21.
9
Figueroa, supra, note 7, at 935-36.
10
Id., at 939-40, paras. 36-40.
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viewed the third-party advertising restrictions as implicating the informational component of the right to vote. In other words:
The right to meaningful participation includes a citizen’s right to
exercise his or her vote in an informed manner. For a voter to be well
informed, the citizen must be able to weigh the relative strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate and political party. The citizen must
also be able to consider opposing aspects of issues associated with
certain candidates and political parties where they exist. In short, the
voter has a right to be “reasonably informed of all the possible
11
choices”: Libman, at para. 47.

(Emphasis added)
On this analysis, spending limits are necessary in order to protect
citizens’ right to electoral information. Voters are entitled to hear all
points of view, and the affluent or individuals who combine resources
cannot be permitted to dominate political discourse. An inequal dissemination of points of view would undermine voters’ ability to be adequately informed of all views, and thus spending limits are necessary
and subject only to the restriction that they not be overly low so as to
undermine the right to information in the context of an election.12 In
holding that the spending restrictions did not violate section 3,
Bastarache J. stated as follows:
Meaningful participation in elections is not synonymous with the
ability to mount a media campaign capable of determining the
outcome. In fact, such an understanding of “meaningful participation”
would leave little room in the political discourse for the individual
citizen and would be inimical to the right to vote. Accordingly, there is
no infringement of s. 3 in this case and no conflict between the right to
13
vote and freedom of expression.

In our view, the majority approach in Harper misunderstands the
nature of third parties and their role during an election. This misunderstanding provides the basis for what is a very unequal approach to electoral regulation. While individuals are undoubtedly entitled to
information during an election and third parties can be a source of this
11
12
13

Harper, supra, note 1, at 872, para. 71.
Id.
Id., at 873-74, para. 74.
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information, third parties are also an important vehicle through which
individuals exercise their right to meaningfully participate in the democratic process. The majority in Harper appeared to view arguments with
respect to third parties’ participatory role as a conflation of the right to
vote with that of freedom of expression, and rejected the idea that the
right to vote contained a right to electoral debate or expression.14 Respectfully, this is too narrow a view of the role of third parties, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Figueroa.
In Figueroa, Iacobucci J. reviewed the meaningful role that small
political parties play in the democratic process. The importance of the
role of small parties was expressly not correlated to the question of
whether or not they would actually participate in governance, as small
parties are both a vehicle and an outlet for meaningful individual participation. Political parties ensure that ideas and opinions are effectively
represented in the open debate of an election, and are presented to the
electorate. According to the Court, smaller parties play a special role
since they tend to dissent from mainstream thinking and therefore bring
forward a variety of issues and concerns, and provide individuals with
an opportunity to express opinions on governmental policy.15
The Court’s analysis in Figueroa applies equally to third parties
during an election campaign. Meaningful participation in an election is
not solely related to a potential role in actual governance. As acknowledged by the minority in Harper and by Feasby, third parties perform
many of the same functions as small parties and are uniquely positioned
to do so with a greater level of fidelity to political ideas, and as such are
a valuable and indeed essential part of the democratic process. As individuals or groups who are not seeking election, third parties are not
subject to the need to cater their views to appeal to a broad audience.
Third parties can and do both challenge positions taken by parties and
candidates, and bring forward new issues that parties are unable or unwilling to address.16 Third parties, like small parties, are both a vehicle
and an outlet for individual participation, and thus play a meaningful
role in the electoral process.
Given the above, following Figueroa the proper question for the
Court in Harper was whether the spending restrictions interfere with
14
15
16

Id., at 870, paras. 67-69.
Figueroa, supra, note 7, at 940-43, paras. 38-48.
Harper, supra, note 1, at 840-41.

298

Supreme Court Law Review

(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)

third parties’ capacity to play a meaningful role in an election. Further,
according to Iacobucci J. in Figueroa, “legislation that exacerbates a
pre-existing disparity in the capacity of the various political parties to
communicate their positions to the general public is inconsistent with
s. 3.”17 Had the majority in Harper asked the proper questions, the answer could only have been in the affirmative. The spending restrictions
create a significant barrier to third party participation, not the least of
which is to exacerbate the significant disparity that already existed between the ability of parties and candidates to communicate their positions, and that of third parties. This disparity is anything but egalitarian.
Political parties and candidates are provided with significant support
and access to resources both during and after election campaigns. Under
the Elections Act, registered political parties are provided with access to
information regarding voters, which can be used both for communicating positions and for soliciting contributions.18 During elections,
parties receive both free and discounted access to prime-time broadcasting and partial reimbursement for election expenses.19 Registered parties
who obtain a minimum level of electoral support also receive an annual
allowance based on the number of votes received by the party in the
previous general election.20 Further, donations to political parties or
candidates are eligible for tax deductions under the Income Tax Act.21
In contrast, third parties receive no such support. Donations to thirdparty interest groups are not tax deductible. Broadcasters are not required to provide time to third parties during an election campaign, and
no third party expenses are reimbursable by the federal government.
Third parties are thus already at a significant disadvantage vis-à-vis
political parties in terms of their ability to participate in an election
campaign. To further restrict these groups to spending only $150,000
nationally on advertising during an election is to create such a disparity
as to effectively prevent third parties from participating meaningfully in
an election campaign. In Harper, Bastarache J. relied on a perceived
danger of third parties drowning out the voices of candidates; in fact the

17
18
19
20
21

Figueroa, supra, note 7, at 946, para. 54.
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 45, 110.
Id., ss. 335, 339, 435.
Id., s. 435.01.
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 127(3).
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opposite is the case. Third parties’ voices are now effectively excluded
from electoral discourse.
To say that the egalitarian approach requires that third parties be
equally restricted in their advertising spending also ignores the fact that
finances are not allocated equally between parties themselves, nor is
access to the media, as discussed above. It is difficult to see why, when
resources and restrictions are not equally allocated between candidates
and parties, third-party spending need be restricted on an “across-theboard” basis in order to ensure fairness in the democratic process.
Thus notwithstanding the Court’s adoption of the egalitarian model,
the reality is that regulation of democratic processes occurs on a spectrum between egalitarian and libertarian principles, with any given set of
rules landing at different points on that spectrum depending on the point
of comparison. Attempts to equalize one resource (i.e., money), while
adopting a libertarian approach to other resources (i.e., access to the
media) can exacerbate existing inequalities rather than remedy them.
The third-party spending rules are a good example. In one sense, the
rules create a form of restrictive equality between third parties since no
one group can spend more than the prescribed limit. In another sense,
however, the rules increase the already significant inequality between
third parties and political parties.

III. DEFERENCE TO PARLIAMENT’S CHOICE IN ELECTORAL
REGULATION IS INAPPROPRIATE
In Harper, the majority of the Court articulated a deferential approach, as expressed by Bastarache J.:
Under the egalitarian model of elections, Parliament must balance
the rights and privileges of the participants in the electoral process:
candidates, political parties, third parties and voters …. Given the
right of Parliament to choose Canada’s electoral model and the
nuances inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach
the justification analysis with deference …. In the end, the electoral
system, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its
duration and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a
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political choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.
(Emphasis added)

22

Feasby’s paper recognizes that regulation of democratic processes is
vulnerable to abuse, given the potential for self-interested behaviour on
the part of Parliament. Feasby suggests that the Court must be cautious to
confine its deference to the electoral realm, and argues that there should
be less deference outside of that context. To that end, Feasby distinguishes between “sham” issue advocacy and “pure” issue advocacy.
In our view, deference both within and outside of the electoral realm
is unwarranted and potentially dangerous, for two main reasons. As
noted in Harper by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., there is literally no
evidence to support a claim that third-party advertising has a determinative effect on an election.23 The concern with third-party expenditures
and with money in general is motivated by the American congressional
experience, which in our view is not an appropriate comparator. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a review of electoral regulation
demonstrates Parliament’s clear tendency to legislate in its own selfinterest.
Much of the concern in Canada with the influence of money and
third-party expenditures during elections is influenced by the American
experience. However, little thought or analysis is given to the differences between the Canadian and American political systems. The nature
of the American congressional system of government is that party discipline is weak, elected representatives routinely cross party lines on particular issues, and there is thus fertile ground for influence by wellfunded issue-oriented lobby groups. Canada’s parliamentary democracy,
however, is dominated by the political parties. Party discipline is strong,
and adherence to party lines can bring political rewards such as a sought
after cabinet position. Canadian politicians are much less able to pursue
their own personal agendas once in office, and third parties have less
influence on the legislative behaviour of members of Parliament. Further, recent experience belies any argument that third-party spending is
a significant problem in the Canadian parliamentary system. In fact, the

22

Harper, supra, note 1, at 878-79, para. 87. Note that deference in this context is inconsistent with the approach previously adopted by the Supreme Court in this context. See, for instance, Sauvé, supra, note 4, at 535, and Figueroa, supra, note 7, at 949.
23
Harper, supra, note 1, at 847-48.
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evidence points to the opposite conclusion; in Canada, money does not
guarantee electoral success or even significant influence.
Consider, for example, the result in the 1988 federal election. This
election turned largely on the issue of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (“FTA”). A large number of Canadians opposed the FTA, as
did the Liberal Party, the NDP, and numerous labour unions. The ruling
Conservatives advanced a pro-FTA position, and were supported by a
majority of the corporate sector, including the Business Council on
National Issues which funnelled unprecedented sums into campaigning.
The pro-free trade lobby spent close to 77 cents for every dollar spent
by the Conservatives on campaign advertisements; in contrast, the antifree trade lobby spent only 13 cents on the dollar as compared to the
Liberal and NDP budgets. While the Conservatives won a majority in
the House of Commons, the Liberals and the NDP obtained a majority
of the popular vote. Despite the unparalleled sums spent by the incumbents and its wealthy supporters, the anti-free trade movement prevailed
in terms of votes cast.24
The 1992 referendum over the Charlottetown Accord presents another example. The referendum campaign polarized Canadians between
the “yes” and the “no” sides. Those campaigning for the “no” side consisted of a small set of groups with limited resources. By contrast, the
“yes” side was supported by the major political parties, virtually all of
the English media, and the business community at large. Notwithstanding an overwhelming advantage in money and resources, the “no” side
prevailed when a majority of Canadians voted against ratification of the
Charlottetown Accord.
A second and more fundamental reason for rejecting deference in
the electoral realm is Parliament’s self-interest in regulating democratic
processes. In our view, this self-interest poses a far greater threat to the
integrity of our democratic system and public confidence in it than any
third-party election advertising. Much of the current electoral regime is
clearly designed to protect and promote established parties and/or incumbents.
For instance, the Elections Act provides substantial funding for successful political parties and candidates. Candidates who receive at least
24
Canada: Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Finance, Reforming Electoral Democracy: Final Report (Ottawa: Communication Group Publishing, 1991), vol. 1 at 33738.
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10 per cent of the popular vote in their riding are entitled to reimbursement of 15 per cent of their campaign expenditures.25 Further, political
parties that receive at least 2 per cent of the popular vote generally or 5
per cent of the popular vote in the electoral districts in which the party
runs a candidate are entitled to reimbursement of 50 per cent of campaign expenditures and a quarterly allowance based on a multiple of the
number of votes cast in the district and the percentage of votes the party
received.26 This funding is provided in addition to the incentives for
donations to political parties in the form of tax credits under the Income
Tax Act.
Similarly, the rules relating to the allocation of broadcasting time
during an election clearly favour incumbents. Under the Elections Act,
at the beginning of an election period Canadian broadcasters are required to set aside 6 ½ hours of prime-time broadcasting for discounted
purchase by parties and candidates, and a further amount of time to be
distributed to parties and candidates for free. A Broadcasting Arbitrator
appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer allocates the distribution of this
free and discounted broadcasting time according to a formula guided by
the Elections Act. The Elections Act requires the Broadcasting Arbitrator
to give equal weight to the percentage of seats in the House of Commons by each of the registered parties, and the percentage of the popular
vote received in the previous general election. The Broadcasting Arbitrator must also give weight to the number of candidates endorsed by
each party during the previous election.27 In other words, the more successful the party during the previous election, the greater the allocation
of broadcasting time available.
Finally, as discussed above the restrictions at issue in Harper represent the effective shielding of parties and candidates from any significant challenge by third parties. We should not underestimate the
cumulative effect of these regulations on third-party participants and
smaller or emerging political parties. The Canadian electoral scheme is
clearly designed to enhance and favour incumbents and established
political parties. Deference to Parliament’s choices is not appropriate in
this context.

25
26
27

Elections Act, supra, note 18, s. 464.
Id., ss. 435, 435.a.
Id., ss. 319-62.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Feasby’s paper and his previous scholarship on this topic make a
significant and valuable contribution to our understanding of judicial
review of the democratic process.28 It is, however, important to put the
regulation at issue in Harper in context and recognize that the egalitarian model cannot fully address the variety of participants and resources
at play. Further, we believe that judicial deference is unwarranted and
indeed hazardous in this context.
Experience has shown that a high level of third-party campaign
spending does not trigger the hypothetical evils associated with independent expenditures, nor is its outcome determinative. On the other
hand, there is a clear need to keep Parliament’s tendency towards selfinterested regulation in check, particularly when that tendency is actualized in the form of restrictions to participation in democratic processes.
This need is most acute in the context of electoral regulation. An election is the point at which the voter is most in need of information from
all sources, and thus this is the most important time for political participation by all, including third parties. Government measures that restrict
that participation should, in our view, be strictly scrutinized.

28

Colin Feasby, “Issue advocacy and third parties in the United Kingdom and Canada”
(2002) 48 McGill L.J. 11; Colin Feasby, “Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the administration of
democracy under the Charter: the emerging egalitarian model” (April 1999) 44 McGill L.J. 5;
Colin Feasby, “Public opinion poll restrictions, elections, and the Charter. (The Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: The First Fifteen Years) (Canada)” (1997) 55 U.T.L. Rev. 55, at 241.

